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1 Introduction
One of the main merits to the use of voluntary agreements (VAs) often put forward is that
they o¤er a more practical and exible approach in dealing with environmental pollution
compared to traditional (direct) regulation. Because of this, the use of VAs has expanded
enormously in the last couple of decades across the United States, Europe and Japan ([20],
[23]). However, despite the presence of the inherent exibility and given that rms voluntarily
are willing to participate in such programs to cut back pollution, the natural question arises
as to how rms succeed in allocating abatement tasks among each other. It is a major
challenge by which the participating rms have to nd a response in order to come to an
agreement on how much each of them will contribute in terms of abatement. Surprisingly,
the vast literature on VAs has hardly touched upon the abatement allocation problem. This
paper aims to ll this gap.
Depending on the specic design of VAs, participants may di¤er with respect to the degree
of commitment. In this paper, our focus is on the strictest type: the negotiated agreement
(NA).1 The NA is a contract between a public authority and a rm (or group of rms) that
commit to reduce pollution to an agreed upon level within a certain time period. In return for
the rmsabatement commitment the authority abstains from legal intervention, or imposes
some kind of regulation if rms are not responsive to emissions abatement.2 We develop a
model that can generate an allocation of abatement which is optimal for all participating rms
in the NA. The rmscommitment to abate pollution is like contributing to the production of
a public good of which the producers also act as the consumers. The consumer of the public
good can neither be excluded from consuming the outcome of the collective abatement e¤ort,
nor is there rivalry in consumingabatement.
In order to identify the abatement allocation, the approach applied in this paper is in
the domain of voluntary public goods provision (see, e.g., [6], [10]). A common point of
departure is the assumption that each economic agent considers the quantities supplied by
other participants as given. In the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium representing such cases,
the total supply of the public good is below the e¢ cient level (e.g., [16]). However, some
1See Lyon and Maxwell [20] for an extensive treatment of the di¤erent types of voluntary programs.
2Perhaps one of the earliest successes of this type of agreement was between Japans Yokohama City council
and the Isogo thermal power station on plant design and pollution control issues. Another success was in 1990
in the Netherlands when the Dutch government and the chemical sector came up with an agreement to reduce
toxic waste emissions. In the mid 1990s the German government had a similar successful agreement with
various industrial sectors to cut back carbon dioxide emissions.
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literature  in particular the literature on matching schemes (e.g., [2], [12], [9])  discuss
incentive structures that might induce individual agents to contribute more than the amount
corresponding to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The approach in this paper relates
to that literature but di¤ers in two main ways: (i) we assume abatement costs to be convex
increasing rather than linear; (ii) we do not assume coordination of abatement through a
central planner but through a market mechanism, i.e., the sum of individual abatement
quantities is the market equilibrium outcomeof an exchange between rms in the NA.
The individual rm has private knowledge of his cost function and his benet function.
Costs arise from abatement and the rm weighs them against the private expected benets
from preempting regulation, which is contingent on the regulator accepting the rmscollec-
tive abatement o¤er. The rm participating in the NA maximizes its private net benet by
making abatement o¤ers that are a function of an abatement exchange rate, which shows the
amount of group abatement the supplier gets in return per unit of its own abatement: the
higher the exchange rate, the higher is the individual o¤er. Our proposed model builds on re-
cent developments in the so-called aggregative game literature (e.g., [11]) and extends Nentjes
[24]. We shall demonstrate that in an abatement exchange market where rms o¤er abate-
ment in return for abatement by other participants, an equilibrium is feasible, establishing a
Pareto-e¢ cient allocation of abatement in the NA.
The previous literature on NAs either assumes that the abatement allocation problem
among rms does not exist3 or takes for granted that the allocation of abatement has been
solved ex ante. Although Manzini and Mariotti [21] touch upon the issue by allowing het-
erogeneous rms to negotiate on a collective abatement proposal, they do not deal with the
allocation of the rmsindividual abatement tasks. Wu and Babcock [32] focus on the ef-
ciency of individual contracts between an individual polluter and a regulator (without a
common emission target) relative to the cost of direct regulation.4
The main literature has predominantly concentrated on the role of the abatement target,
particularly in relation to degree of stringency in comparison to direct regulation. The seminal
contribution in this domain is Segerson and Miceli [26] who developed a model where the
regulator negotiates with an individual rm (or an industry representative) over the level of
abatement. The underlying assumption is that both sides can gain if legislative intervention
3By hypothesizing that there is only one rm or by letting an industry representative negotiate with the
regulator about the emission target.
4See Alberini and Segerson [1] for a survey.
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can be avoided by voluntarily agreeing on an environmental standard. In a similar way the
role of legislative threats in triggering voluntary abatement has been explored (e.g., [27], [15],
[22], [8], [13], [29]), and the role of demand considerations (green consumerism) as drivers
of voluntary (over)compliance ([5]). In the spirit of Segerson and Miceli [26], Glachant [14]
analyzes how non-enforceability a¤ects the pollution abatement target under VAs when the
polluter has the option to reduce the stringency of the regulators mandated abatement by
lobbying congress. Manzini and Mariotti [21] investigate the impact on the emission target of
the rm with the most aggressive attitude towards pollution control. The empirical literature
on voluntary programs focuses on the motives for participation and on results in terms of
pollution abatement (e.g., [4], [18], [30], [31]).
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, the general model will be introduced. In
section 3, we derive the NA equilibrium and examine its properties. It will be shown that the
equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient. We also show that the NA under-performs relative to market-
based instruments when rms are heterogeneous. In addition, the potential cost savings that
can be derived from a NA increases with rm heterogeneity. However, the NA realizes almost
all of the cost savings when the potential cost savings are low and it realizes only a certain
share of the cost savings if the potential savings are relatively high. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a set of rms N = f1; : : : ; ng that take part in a NA. Firm i 2 N faces an abatement
cost function Ci(qi); where qi denotes rm is level of emission abatement. As usual, C 0i(qi) > 0
and C 00i (qi) > 0. The expected cost of direct regulation for rm i is represented as xed total
costs, CRi : A rm prefers to take part in a NA rather than be regulated if it expects that the
associated costs will be lower compared to being regulated, i.e., if Ci(qi) < CRi :
The cost savings from a NA compared to direct regulation arise mainly from two sources.
First, regulation may require the rm to take abatement measures that are X-ine¢ cient,
whereas the NA allows exibility to achieve the same level of abatement at lower costs.
Second, cost savings will also result if the rms abatement commitment is lower under the
NA than the mandated level of abatement under regulation. The rms range of economically
feasible abatement levels runs from the prevailing mandatory or voluntary levels of abatement
up to the level where the e¢ cient abatement costs are equal to the costs of regulation that
is expected if the NA proposed by the rms is not accepted by the regulator. The NA does
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not yield cost savings if the threat of regulation is not credible, hence it will be impossible to
establish an agreement.
The aggregate amount of abatement by the group of polluters is simply:
Q =
nX
i=1
qi = qi +Q i; (1)
where Q i is the sum of abatement by all rms except rm i. The rms as a group face
the possibility that regulation will be imposed onto them if Q < eQ; with eQ referring to
the regulators aspiration level. This aspiration level is assumed to be exogenous. Firms
are assumed to have imperfect information about the regulators aspiration level, which 
if achieved voluntarily would annihilate the threat of imposed regulation. Normally the
authority will give an indication of its target level, but group members may expect that a
somewhat lower aggregate abatement o¤er could nevertheless be acceptable by the environ-
mental authority. It is implicitly assumed that the probability of preempting the regulatory
cost CRi is increasing in aggregate abatement, Q. Denote (Q) 2 [0; 1] as the probability of
preempting regulation with 0(Q) > 0 and 00(Q) < 0 for Q 2 [Q;Q], where Q and Q are a
lower and upper bound respectively. Thus, the term  represents the probability of preempt-
ing the regulatory threat, which is considered to be uniform across rms that participate in
the NA. The expected (private) benets of rm i in the NA, denoted Bi(Q); can now be
specied in terms of the expected avoided cost of regulation:
Bi(Q) = (Q)C
R
i : (2)
We assume that the probability of preempting regulation is maximal ( = 1) if aggregate
abatement exceeds the level of aggregate abatement expected under regulation, i.e., if Q  Q:
Beyond this point the rms expected benet does not increase anymore. Marginal benets
are therefore considered to be concave increasing in abatement for Q 2 [Q;Q]; i.e., B0i(Q) > 0
and B00i (Q) < 0:
The coordination of the rmsabatement decisions is modelled as an exchange mechanism.
The participating rm is a potential consumer of the public good (aggregate abatement, Q)
but also contributes to its production. A rms single abatement o¤er, qi; depends on an
exchange rate, which is the quantity Qi the rm expects to receive in return from the total
group of rms per unit of its own individual abatement o¤er qi:
pi =
Qi
qi
(i = 1; : : : ; n); (3)
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Put di¤erently, the individual rm acts on the expectation that for every unit of abatement
it o¤ers, it will receive Qi units of total abatement in return.5 Firm i views the exchange
rate as exogenous. By implication, one can rewrite (3) such that:
Qi = piqi; (4)
which can be interpreted as the total abatement rm i implicitly demandsgiven its individual
abatement supply o¤er.
In addition to the information on the abatement exchange rate, it is assumed rm i
has perfect knowledge about its (convex) cost function Ci(qi) and (concave) benet function
Bi(Q): Firm i maximizes net benets accordingly as follows:
max
qi
i = Bi(Qi)  Ci(qi) (5)
s.t. Qi   piqi = 0:
The rst-order conditions to (5) are:
piB
0
i(Qi) = C
0
i(qi); (6a)
Qi   piqi = 0: (6b)
Substituting (6b) into (6a) and writing the endogenous variable qi as a function of the ex-
change rate pi transforms the rst-order conditions into rm is abatement supply function:
qi = qi(pi); (7)
where q0i(pi) > 0 and q
00
i (pi) > 0: A rms abatement o¤er progressively increases with the
exchange rate so long as the marginal benets of abatement are positive.6 The intuition is
simple. Equation (6a) shows that for exchange rates pi > 1 the rms marginal benet of
abatement increases whilst a higher marginal cost of abatement is incurred. Marginal benets
increase when the exchange rate increases because the rm gets more total abatement per
unit of its own abatement.7
The coordination of abatement is modeled as a market in which the rms act as producers
of the public good  supplying individual abatement quantities qi  while at the same time
5Alternatively, these exchange rates give an indication of the degree of reciprocity in the abatement nego-
tiations.
6See the appendix for the formal proof.
7Note that pi = 1 is the non-cooperative Nash solution. In our model, with exchange rates pi > 1; marginal
costs (hence abatement) are higher than in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
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act as consumers by demanding total abatement Qi: In equilibrium, the abatement exchange
rates are such that total abatement supply of all rms meets the demand of every single
rm. The rms abatement supply (7) multiplied with the exchange rate pi denes the rms
aggregate abatement demand as dened in (6b). Since total abatement Q is a public good
and available to all rms in the NA, an equilibrium only exists if all rms demand the same
quantity, implying:
Qi = Q =
nX
i=1
qi (i = 1; : : : ; n): (8)
With n abatement demand functions (6b), n abatement supply functions (7) and n equilib-
rium conditions (8), one can solve qi; pi; Qi and Q: In equilibrium the vector of individual
exchange rates is such that the rmsindividual abatement supply o¤ers sum up to the total
supply of the public good (that is, aggregate abatement), which is equal to the quantity
demanded by every single rm.8
3 The negotiated agreement equilibrium
We will now turn to a more detailed examination of the NA equilibrium and rst discuss the
properties of the equilibrium and make an assessment of its e¢ ciency (section 3.1). This is
followed by an examination of how di¤erences in marginal costs and marginal benets a¤ect
the allocation of abatement e¤orts concludes (section 3.2).
3.1 Equilibrium properties
To facilitate a transparent presentation, and without loss of generality, we will concentrate
on a NA with just two rms, denoted rm 1 and rm 2. Using (6a), the rst-order conditions
for rm 1 and rm 2 are indicated by (9a) and (9b) respectively; using (6b) and (8) gives the
corresponding market-level equilibria conditions as shown by (9c) and (9d):
p1B
0
1(Q) = C
0
1(q1) (9a)
p2B
0
2(Q) = C
0
2(q2) (9b)
p1q1 = Q (9c)
p2q2 = Q: (9d)
8See Kryazhimskii et al [19] for a formal proof of the equilibrium existence as well as a description of the
(dynamic) adjustment process towards the equilibrium. They show that with strictly convex cost functions
and strictly concave benet functions the equilibrium is unique.
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We will use rearranged forms of these rst order conditions to support the actual assessment
of the equilibrium properties. Using (9c) and (9d), dividing (9a) by (9b) and rearranging
gives:
q2
q1
=
C 01(q1)
C 02(q2)
B02(Q)
B01(Q)
: (10)
Since Q =
P2
i=1 qi = q1 + q2; equation (9c) can be written as p1 = Q=q1 = (q1 + q2)=q1 =
1 + q2=q1: Using this expression, (9a) then reads C 01(q1) = (1 + q2=q1)B01(Q): Substitution of
(10) into the latter expression yields (11a). Equation (11b) can be obtained by analogy:
B01(Q) +
C 01(q1)
C 02(q2)
B02(Q) = C
0
1(q1); (11a)
B02(Q) +
C 02(q2)
C 01(q1)
B01(Q) = C
0
2(q2): (11b)
Firms will participate in a NA only if it raises their net benets compared to non-
participation. To prove that the equilibrium is a Pareto e¢ cient outcome we rst derive
the rst order conditions for Pareto e¢ ciency, which are then being compared with (11a)
and (11b). Pareto e¢ ciency here implies maximizing the net benets of rm 1 while not
decreasing the net benets of rm 2. Formally:
max1 = B1(Q)  C1(q1) (12)
s.t. 2  B2(Q)  C2(q2)
Solving (12) yields the following rst order conditions for achieving Pareto e¢ ciency:9
B01(Q) +
C 01(q1)
C 02(q2)
B02(Q) = C
0
1(q1); (13a)
B02(Q) +
C 02(q2)
C 01(q1)
B01(Q) = C
0
2(q2): (13b)
Comparing (13a) and (13b) with the rst order conditions of the NA equilibrium indicated
by (11a) and (11b) respectively reveals that they are identical, i.e., the NA is Pareto e¢ cient.
This implies that in a NA where rms can make abatement o¤ers there is no room for any
rm to increase its individual net benets without harming the net benets of other rms.
Therefore,
Proposition 1 The equilibrium achieved through bidding on (reciprocal) emissions abate-
ment is Pareto e¢ cient.
9See the appendix for the derivations of this optimization problem for the general n-rm case.
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From equations (11a), (11b), (13a) and (13b) it can be seen that the NA is Pareto e¢ cient
even though the condition for full cost e¢ ciency  where marginal costs are equalized  is
generally not met, i.e., C 01(q1) 6= C 02(q2): Furthermore, also aggregate marginal benets could
be higher or lower relative to marginal abatement costs. As a next step let us examine how
this heterogeneity a¤ects the equilibrium.
3.2 The impact of rm heterogeneity on the NA equilibrium
Table 1 summarizes the main possible congurations that can be distilled from the rst order
conditions of the NA equilibrium shown by equation (10).
Table 1: Possible congurations of the NA equilibrium with two rms
C 01 = C 02 and B01 = B02 C 01 < C 02 and B01 = B02 C 01 = C 02 and B01 > B02
q1 = q2 q1 > q2 q1 > q2
p1 = p2 p1 < p2 p1 < p2
C 01 = C 02 C 01 < C 02 C 01 > C 02
B01 = B02 B01 = B02 B01 > B02
B01 +B02 = C 01 = C 02 C 01 < B01 +B02 < C 02 C 02 < B01 +B02 < C 01
The rst column of Table 1 with homogeneous benet and cost functions will serve as the
benchmark. In this case all terms on the LHS and RHS of (10) are equal to one, including
the abatement exchange rate q1=q2: Consequently all equations in the rst column of Table
1 are equalities. Equal marginal costs for rm 1 and 2 means that the NA attains full cost
e¢ ciency. The last entry in the rst column, stating that the marginal abatement costs are
equal to the sum of marginal benets from abatement, is identical to the well-known rst
order condition for the optimal provision of a public good. From (8) it follows that in case
of n homogeneous rms, piqi = nqi and pi = p = n. The internalization of the aggregate
marginal benets in the decision of each rm makes that for the individual rm the marginal
benets are raised with a factor n compared to the non-cooperative (Nash) solution, hence
the marginal cost and abatement will therefore exceed the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
values.
Now let the marginal benet functions still be identical (implying B01(Q)=B02(Q) = 1)
but assume rm 1 and rm 2 are the low and high marginal abatement cost rm respec-
tively. Starting from the benchmark values q1 = q2; we then have C 01(q1) < C 02(q2): Con-
sequently q2=q1 > C 01(q1)=C 02(q2): However, the equilibrium condition (10) requires q2=q1 =
C 01(q1)=C 02(q2): This can only be realized by raising q1 relative to q2; which lowers q2=q1 while
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pushing up C 01(q1)=C 02(q2) until equality is attained. Therefore, the equilibrium has the prop-
erty q2 < q1 and C 02(q2) > C 01(q1): From the abatement exchange rate denitions it follows
that in equilibrium p2 > p1: Thus lower (higher) marginal abatement costs for rm i 2 1; 2
implies higher (lower) abatement, qi: With symmetric benet functions the rm with the
lowest marginal cost has the lowest marginal cost in the NA equilibrium despite its relatively
high level of abatement. However, although the low (high) cost rm increases (decreases)
abatement, its marginal abatement costs still remains below (above) the level of q1 (q2) where
marginal costs are equal. Compared to a position of equality of abatement, which might be
required under direct regulation, allowing for the possibility to put in abatement o¤ers helps
rms to reduce cost ine¢ ciency; however, full cost e¢ ciency is not attained.
In a similar way we can nd the characteristics of the equilibrium when rms are homoge-
neous in terms of marginal abatement cost functions but heterogeneous in terms of marginal
benet functions. Di¤erences in marginal benets could, for instance, result from di¤erences
in (expected) cost of direct regulation. Consider the case where B01(Q) > B02(Q); as shown in
the third column of Table 1. High marginal benets from preventing regulation induces rm
1 to raise its abatement o¤er relative to rm 2s abatement o¤er. Firm 1 will accept a lower
exchange rate q2=q1 and higher marginal costs compared to the (homogeneous) benchmark
situation. The di¤erence in marginal costs indicates that full cost e¢ ciency is not achieved.
Neither is there maximization of aggregate net benets since the sum of marginal benets
are not equal to marginal costs. From equations (11a) and (11b) one can conclude that the
marginal cost ratio C 01(q1)=C 02(q2) > 1; implying that rm 1 over-abates rm 2 under-abates
compared to maximizing aggregate net benets. With exchange in abatement quantities that
optimal outcome cannot be realized. It would require rm 2 to increase its abatement while
the marginal benets would less than compensate its cost, hence making rm 2 worse o¤.
As we can see in Table 1, the low marginal cost rm and the rm with the highest
cost savings from preventing regulation take the largest share in the total abatement. This
conrms the intuition one would have about the obligations rms are willing to accept in
a NA. However, in our model such voluntary abatement contributions are not made out
of considerations of fairness or solidarity, neither are they made under pressure from other
rms. They come voluntarily, out of self-interest, with the aim to maximize the individual
net benets expected from participating in the NA by raising the probability of preempting
regulation.
10
What can we say about the NAs relative cost e¢ ciency? Generally market-based instru-
ments provide rms with the incentive to control pollution up to the level where marginal
abatement costs are equal, which ensures full cost e¢ ciency. Except in the special case where
rms are identical in the sense that they face homogeneous marginal benet and cost func-
tions, it appears that marginal abatement costs are not equalized in the NA equilibrium,
however. If rms are heterogeneous one rm abates too much, the other too little, and
the NA does not attain the full cost e¢ ciency as would be the result under market-based
schemes. Thus, in cost e¢ ciency the NA remains behind what market-based instruments
can achieve. The e¢ ciency gap compared to market-based instruments is larger the more
heterogeneous rms are in both their marginal abatement cost functions and in their mar-
ginal benet functions. Consider, for instance, the second column of Table 1. Raising the
marginal cost function of rm 2, C 02(q2); has the e¤ect that C 01(q1)=C 02(q2) < 1 is decreasing
in equation (11a) and increasing C 02(q2)=C 01(q1) > 1 in (11b). In other words, the larger the
di¤erence in marginal cost functions the larger is the discrepancy between marginal costs in
equilibrium and the lower is the cost e¢ ciency. In a similar way it can be demonstrated that
raising the high marginal benet function B01(Q) increases C 01(q1)=C 02(q2) > 1 and decreases
C 02(q2)=C 01(q1) < 1 in equilibrium. The larger the di¤erence in marginal benets (reecting
di¤erences in the expected costs of regulation) the larger is the discrepancy between marginal
cost and the less cost e¢ cient the NA is. In sum:
Proposition 2 In case rms are heterogeneous the negotiated agreement is less cost e¢ -
cient compared to market-based schemes and the relative e¢ ciency gap increases with rm
heterogeneity.
Equations (11a) and (11b) show that for heterogeneous rms the sum of marginal benets
is not equalized to the e¢ cient marginal cost level in equilibrium but lies somewhere between
the low and high marginal abatement cost. The economic intuition is that in the Pareto
e¢ cient NA equilibrium the probability that the regulator will accept and endorse the NA is
not optimized. There is a loss of aggregate net benets due to setting aggregate abatement
either below or above the optimal level. A value of aggregate abatement lower than optimal
means a higher probability that the NA will not be endorsed by the regulator; aggregate
abatement higher than optimal increases the probability that the abatement o¤ered in the
NA exceeds the level of abatement the regulator would have accepted.
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These ndings give food for scepticism about the NAs cost e¢ ciency. Although the NA
performs better than regulation there are strong arguments to rate it lower than market-
based instruments in this sense. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that the uniformity
of abatement requirements is a major cause of the cost ine¢ ciency of direct regulation. If
rms are more or less identical, and consequently the abatement costs and expected cost of
regulation are rather similar, uniform performance standards will not lead to large di¤erences
in marginal costs and can subsequently be tagged as reasonablye¢ cient. In this case, cost
savings from a NA  instead of being regulated  will be low. The result is di¤erent when
rms are heterogenous in terms of abatement costs. If such a situation applies, potential
cost savings will be large under uniform regulation. However, we have shown that under
these circumstances the NA does not succeed in bringing marginal costs together and a fair
share of potential cost savings will not be reaped. The intuitive explanation is that the low
cost rm refuses to expand abatement further because the NA would become more costly
than regulation and the high cost rm cannot reduce its abatement because the low cost rm
simply would not accept that. The conclusion is that the NA realizes almost all potential
cost savings when those savings are low and that it realizes only a certain part if potential
cost savings are high.10
4 Conclusions
This paper presents a model that coordinates and allocates emissions abatement between
rms that participate in a voluntary agreement. We concentrate on the strictest form of a
voluntary agreement, i.e., the negotiated agreement (NA). The NA is modeled as a mechanism
that steers the participating rmsvoluntary exchange of pollution abatement o¤ers. A rm
o¤ers emissions abatement in response to proposed abatement exchange rates, which indicate
how much aggregate abatement a rm receives in return from the total group of rms per unit
of its own individual abatement o¤er. In equilibrium the abatement exchange rates are such
that the collective abatement o¤er equals each individual rms demand for abatement. We
nd that the NA equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient and that rms with low marginal abatement
costs and/or high marginal benets take the largest share in total abatement.
Given that only quantities of abatement can be traded, and monetary side payments are
10Evidently, in case rms are heterogenous the introduction of side payments would allow rms to achieve
a fully cost e¢ cient allocation of abatement. Side payments here could reect a scheme of permit trading as
a complement to the NA, as shown in Nentjes et al. [25].
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ruled out, no rm can improve its net benets in equilibrium without hurting the net benet of
another rm. The NA equilibrium is therefore Pareto e¢ cient. However, one can tag the NA
to be constrained Pareto e¢ cient. The implication is that not all potential cost savings are
realized and aggregate abatement is either too low or too high compared to fully optimizing
the probability that the regulator will endorse the NA and abstains from regulation.
Further, although the NA delivers cost savings compared to direct regulation, marginal
abatement costs are not equalized across rms if rms are heterogeneous. Given the well-
known feature of equalized marginal abatement costs under market-based environmental
policy, the NAs cost e¢ ciency is therefore lower compared to market-based instruments.
The NA is modestly cost e¢ cient when rms are heterogeneous in abatement costs and
potential cost savings are large; the NA is highly cost e¢ cient when rms are homogeneous
in abatement costs and potential cost savings are small.
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A Appendix
Derivation of equations (13a) and (13b)
We solve the objective function for the general case with n rms. The maximization problem
here is maxqi i = Bi(Q)  Ci(qi) subject to Bj(Q)  Cj(qj)  j ; (j 6= i). The Lagrangian
accordingly reads:
Li = Bi(Q)  Ci(qi) +
n iX
j
j [Bj(Q)  Cj(qj) j ] i = 1; : : : ; n; i 6= j; (14)
where j and  are the Lagrange multipliers. The rst-order conditions are:
@Li
@qi
= B0i(qi)  C 0i(qi) +
n iX
j
jB
0
j(Q) = 0 (15a)
@Li
@qj
= B0i(qj) + jB
0
j(qj)  jC 0j(qj) = 0 (for all j 6= i) (15b)
j  0 and j = 0 if Bj(Q)  Cj(qj) > j (15c)
where (15c) is the usual complementary slackness condition. Eq (15a) can be rewritten as
B0i(qi) +
n iP
j
jB
0
j(Q) = C
0
i(qi) and Eq (15b) as B
0
i(qj) + jB
0
j(qj) = jC
0
j(qj): Rewriting
B0i(qi) as
@B
@qi
= @B@Q
@Q
@qi
and B0i(qj) as
@B
@qj
= @B@Q
@Q
@qj
; where @Q@qi =
@Q
@qj
= 1; one obtains @B@qi =
@B
@qj
(i = 1; : : : ; n; i 6= j): Using this expression, from Eqs (15a) and (15b) it follows that the
shadow price reads j =
C0i(qi)
C0j(qj)
: Substitution of this into (15a) then results in:
B0i(Q) +
n iX
j 6=i
C 0i(qi)
C 0j(qj)
B0j(Q) = C
0
i(qi): (16)

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